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THE APPELLATE LAWYER'S ROLE IN
THE CASELOAD CRISIS
Michael Vitiello*
The topics of caseload and case management now dominate
discussion about federal courts.' Indeed, many recent Supreme
Court decisions reflect the Court's concern with an overcrowded
docket.2 As a result, the Supreme Courts and many commentators" have looked favorably on alternative dispute resolution
proposals as a means of lightening the caseload.
* Professor

of Law, Loyola School of Law, New Orleans,

Louisiana, B.A.,

Swarthmore College 1969; J.D., University of Pennsylvania 1974. This article is an expanded version of a speech presented by the author at the 1988 Fifth Circuit Judicial
Conference.
' See generally P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL, 111, 121-230 (1976)(general discussion of problems in appeals process resulting from increased caseload); Resnick, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 603-25
(1985)(discussion of effect of heavy caseload on doctrine limiting access to adjudication);
Resnick, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 474-448 (1982)(general discussion of
evolving judicial role as response to caseload difficulties); Hoffman, The Bureaucratic
Spectra: Newest Challenge to the Courts, 66 JUDICATURE 60, 60-72 (1982)(discussion of
judge's administrative responsibilities).
' See, e.g., Walters v. National Assoc. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 334-35
(1985)(upholding statute limiting attorneys' fees to $10.00 in cases before Veteran's Administration); Marek v. Chesnyk, 473 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985)(applying FED. R. Clv. P. 68 to
attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, thereby increasing incentive to settle civil rights
cases).
3 See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2344-46
(1987)(holding "RICO" statute not punitive in nature, therefore, civil RICO claim not
precluded from resolution by arbitration); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 850, 587-58 (1986)(upholding constitutionality of agency proceedings,
emphasizing interest in inexpensive, expeditious alternative to litigation); Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agricultural Products, 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985)(upholding as constitutional statute requiring binding arbitration in cases arising under FIFRA).
' See generally, Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case
Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 253-277 (1985)(purposes use of case management techniques encouraging alternative dispute resolution); Newman, Rethinking Fairness:Perspectives on the
Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643-59 (1985)(general discussion of caseload crisis on
quality of litigation process).

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 58

Moreover, many federal judges have added their voices to
the debate over the so-called "caseload crisis" and the various
remedies proposed. To be sure, the caseload affects these judges
most directly; it determines both the pace of their work and
their perception of the job itself. Many of them lament the passing of an era as recent as twenty years ago when federal courts
of appeals were collegial places where appellate judges had ample time to deliberate on the cases before them.' Moreover, it
can probably be said without dissent that the overloaded federal
court system also creates serious problems for litigants, lawyers
and the courts. A heavy caseload can slow the decision making
process to an unacceptable level, and yet efforts to keep pace to
avoid delayed justice may produce unjust results. For instance,
hasty deliberation may produce inconsistent decisions within a
federal circuit, while this same caseload pressure reduces en
banc review, preventing correction of those inconsistent
decisions.
However, proposed solutions to this caseload problem are
fraught with difficulties. For example, creating new judgeships
would have definite disadvantages, even if that course were politically and economically feasible.8 Furthermore, although liberal Warren Court doctrine unquestionably contributed to the
dramatic increase in the volume of litigation in the 1960s, e the
5 Am. J. TRiAL ADvoc., 63, 63-80 (1981)(discussion of mechanics of appellate process); Rubin, Bureaucratizationof the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice
and Efficiency, 55 N.D. LAWYER, 648, 648-59 (1980)(general discussion of caseload increase in federal courts); Higginbotham, Bureaucracy - The Carcinoma of the Federal
Judiciary,31 ALA. L. REV. 261, 261-72 (1980)(general discussion of problems caused by
heavy caseload). See also, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 21-23 (prepared statement of Chief Judge James P. Coleman, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit).
' See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 5, at 648 (noting that author once felt federal judges
were "magisterial if not regal").
See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the
District of Columbia Circuit, 114 F.R.D. 419, 546-48 (1986) (hereinafter Proceedings]
(comments of Ms. Knab, suggesting that large federal deficit makes new judgeships improbable). Apart from the deficit, one must recognize that as long as the Democratic
Party controls Congress and a Republican is President, Congress may not be motivated
to afford the President the opportunity to annoint a large number of lifetime appointees.
' See Howard, Our Litigious Society, 38 S.C. L. REV. 365, 369-70 (1987)(Warren
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volume of federal litigation nonetheless has continued to increase throughout the 1970s and 1980s even as the Burger and
Rehnquist courts have eroded those same liberal precedents.1
Congress also is responsible for a large part of the increased
caseload because over the years it created a host of new federal
rights without regard to the impact on the judiciary.1 Thus, it is
difficult to even isolate the cause or causes of the burgeoning
federal docket.
In any event, prominent commentators have reacted to the
perceived crisis and advocated significant curtailment of federal
court jurisdiction. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist has advocated abolition of the appeal of right to the federal courts of
appeals.1 2 Other observers have suggested elimination of federal
court jurisdiction altogether in specific classes of cases.' s To be
sure, some of the suggested remedies are politically neutral; for
example, when a commentator suggests elimination of diversity
jurisdiction, one does not suspect a hidden political agenda.',
Court activism helped create litigation explosion). Examples of Warren Court cases

which increased litigation in federal court are numerous. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S., 1, 8-9 (1964)(applying fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to
states through fourteenth amendment); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 passim (1963)(expanding general range of cases cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961)(applying fourth amendment's exclusionary rule to states
through fourteenth amendment).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-69 (1982)(applying strict cause
and prejudice standards to procedural default by federal prisoner in § 2255 proceeding);
Sumner v. Mats, 449 U.S. 539, 547-49 (1981)(strengthening presumption of correctness
given to state court fact finding in habeas proceedings); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 87-90 (1977)(enforcing strict procedural default standard in § 2254 proceedings);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492-94 (1976)(holding state prisoner's claimed fourth
amendment violation beyond review in habeas proceeding where prisoner had full and
fair opportunity to litigate question in state court). Professor Howard suggests that the
Burger Court has opened up new areas of litigation. Howard, supra note 9, at 370.
" Rubin, supra note 5 at 657-58. See Howard, supra note 9, at 370 (cites various
rights expanded by Burger Court including abortion and commercial speech).
12 Address by Justice William Rehnquist at the 75th Anniversary of the University
of Florida College of Law and the Dedication of Bruton-Greer Hall (Sept. 15, 1984).
"3 See Rubin,
supra note 5, at 658 (suggested elimination of federal diversity
jurisdiction).
14 Id. See also, C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 23, at 127-37 (4th ed.
1983)
(discussing arguments for and against general diversity jurisdiction). Id. at 164 (discussing change in reputation of federal courts as pro-business); Shapiro, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction:A Survey and a Proposal, 91 H~Av. L. REV. 317, 334 (1977) (56% of lower
fedefal judges favored elimination of diversity jurisdiction).
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However, such neutrality is not the case when, for example,
Judge Richard Posner calls for judicial restraint and for renunciation of habeas corpus jurisdiction as he does in his provocative
book, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform. 5 Hence, this article attempts to discuss and evaluate the merits of these diverse
approaches to the caseload problem. In the end, however, I assert that courts and commentators should focus their attention
on the lawyers who argue in the appellate courts. Indeed, only
when the deficiencies and laxness of many appellate lawyers are
identified and addressed will there be any real hope of significant improvement in the federal appeals dockets.
This article operates on the premise that access to the federal courts is one of the finest traditions in our governmental
system. Unquestionably, Article III courts have been instrumental in securing individual rights. 16 Thus, even if flawed, the independent federal judiciary works well.1" So too does the appellate
process where oral argument gives litigants direct access to the
decision makers and where written opinions compel the decision
makers to justify their decisions. 8 Because of the value of this
R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISES AND REFORM 186-88, 220-22 (1985).
See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (upholding illegal alien's right to
public education); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54, 166 (1973) (upholding woman's
right to privacy, encompassing right to terminate pregnancy); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (establishing indigent's right to free access to state court to procure a divorce); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (upholding individual's right
to possess obscene material in his home); Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding Virginia anti-miscegenation law unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965) (guaranteeing married couple's right to privacy); Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) enforcing 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (holding segregated schools violative of equal protection).
'7 Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581,
581
(1985). Article III's guarantee of life tenure and protection against diminished compensation may not guarantee independent decision making by all federal judges. Such a system affords greater incentive for independent judgment than does a system where judges
must run for re-election. Id. For discussion of some specific instances where federal
judges have enforced decisions in the face of public outrage, see P. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHoicEs 12 (1988) passim (discussion of numerous cases decided contrary to public
opinion). See also Resnik, supra, at 581 n. 1 (comparing "extraordinary luxuries" in Article III with political pressure brought to bear against former California Chief Justice
Bird).
'8 R. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS § 1 at 14 (1976). As any reader is aware, law
professors and other legal writers subject judicial decisions to agonizing and critical scrutiny, and some judges have viewed traditional scholarship as helpful in their job. See,
"

16
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open access to federal courts, curtailment of jurisdiction or the
elimination of the right of appeal ought to be a remedy of last

resort.
In this article, I examine some of the effects of the increased
caseload on the federal appellate courts. 9 I then examine both
Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Judge Posner's proposals to limit
access to the federal courts. In the end, I conclude that both
proposals are inappropriate.2 ° Instead, I suggest that rather than
impairing a system which reflects important values, we ought to
examine ways in which better advocacy can improve the appellate process.2"
I. THE

COLLEGIAL JUDICIARY

A number of commentators have decried the transformation
of the federal judiciary in the past twenty years.2 2 Specifically,
they bemoan the way in which the appeals courts have proliferated in response to the enormous increase in the appellate
caseload. In their view, this development has transformed the
role of the appellate judge "[f]rom collegial arbiter and solitary
craftsman" to "the equivalent of the managing partner of a
small law firm." 2 This new role for the judge raises concerns
about the adequacy of the court's decision making capacity.
The collegial federal judiciary is often identified with the
work of the Second Circuit during Judge Learned Hand's celebrated tenure on that court. As described by Judge Alvin Rubin,
"Circuit judges [in those days] . . . sat in stately triumvirates
and, after listening to the oratory of argument, retired to their
e.g., Richardson, Law Reviews and the Courts, 5 WHITTIER L. REV. 385, 389-90
(1983)(discussion of role of law students and faculty in shaping the direction of jurisprudence); B. Cardozo, Introduction to SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at vii,
ix (1931).
" See infra notes 22-43 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 44-236 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 237-88 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBURG, supra note 1, at 4-12 (explaining that performance in American appellate systems is threatened by increase in
workload); see generally, Hoffman, supra note 1 (arguing that increase of workload is
converting judiciary into bureaucracy); Rubin, supra note 5 (discussing effect of increased work load on court system).
23 Hoffman, supra note 1, at 63.
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chambers where, in coat and vest, they studied law books and
whence they issued opinions in phrases redolent, if not equal to,
those of Learned Hand and Benjamin Cardozo."2
Perhaps still a reality within the First Circuit, 5 the ideal
model of the appellate court involved "intimacy, continuity and
dynamism in relations among judges ...

"26

Simply stated, a

small number of judges within the same courthouse were able to
"interact with each other, influence each other, and have each
other in mind almost from the time they first read briefs for the
next session of court.

27

However, the dramatic increase in the appellate workload
between 1940 and the present has changed the way appellate
judges perceive their jobs.' 8 While the number of judgeships has
proliferated, judges have still not kept abreast with the
caseload.2' Thus, judges today must decide more cases than their
predecessors. Furthermore, contemporary adjudication is far
more complex than in the past and requires more time for adequate deliberation. 0 Unfortunately, all of these factors dilute
collegial decision making. For example, the Ninth Circuit has
24 Rubin, supra note 5, at 648; see also SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT (1970)
(studying federal courts of appeal and recognizing that most of their work goes unappreciated); Kurland, Jerome N. Frank: Some Reflections and Recollections of a Law
Clerk, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 665 (1957)(introduction to subsequent article by late Judge
Frank discussing Second Circuit Court of Appeals when Judge Learned Hand was senior
member and Judge Frank was junior member).
"6The First Circuit has only six circuit judges. 840 F.2d viii. For a personal account
of the work style of one of those judges, see Coffin, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE (1980).
6 Coffin, supra note 25, at 58.
27

Id.

See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 5, at 657. (desirability of being federal judge is inversely proportionate to number of routine cases brought to federal court). Circuit Judge
(then District Judge) Higginbotham has argued that the quality of federal judges is diminished by the increased caseload and by the trivial nature of some disputes now
within federal court jurisdiction. Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 261-72; see also H.
2

FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION

28-30 (1973) (providing general view of federal jurisdic-

tion); King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of Northern Pipeline v.
Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99, 120 (1983)(discussing effect of Northern Pipeline
which held that 28 U.S.C. § 1471 was unconstitutional because it authorized overbroad
jurisdiction in allowing bankruptcy courts to adjudicate all matters related to cases arising under Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code).
2
Hoffman, supra note 1, at 63; Rubin, supra note 5, at 650-51.
Hoffman, supra note 1, at 63; Rubin, supra note 5, at 649.
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twenty-eight circuit judges. 1 The circuit covers nine states and
thousands of miles.32 Thus, size makes collegiality impossible because one judge among twenty-eight will sit infrequently with
another judge. Similarly, especially where a circuit includes
judges appointed by presidents with philosophies as diverse as
John Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, conflicts within the circuit
are inevitable, 33 but "[als the need for en banc review grows,
• . . the ability 4 of the enlarged courts to harmonize opinions
3
falls inversely.
Although difficult to quantify, the caseload pressure and resultant time constraints and loss of congeniality affect the quality of the judiciary's work product. As argued by Judge Rubin,
...
courts . . . are unable to cope with the torrent of cases
without resorting to measures adopted primarily as time savers." 3 5 Such measures include abandoning oral argument and a
formal written opinion in many cases.3 6 Consequently, as
"[m]ore conflicting opinions are rendered, the law becomes less
predictable and less effective as a guide to behavior.""
Judges admit that much of the work of judging must be delegated to law clerks. To handle the volume of work, judges are
sharing the task of actual decision making with their clerks. Current law clerks, "among the brightest and ablest graduates of
our law schools, are not merely shelving books and running citations in Shepard's. They are in many situations parajudges. ' 3
Eventually, transferring too much responsibility to recent
law school graduates results in less informed decisions.3 9 Indeed

" Wasby, Technology and Communication in a Federal Court: The Ninth Circuit,
1, 3 (1988).
" Hoffman, supra note 1, at 62.
" For example, Judge James Browning was appointed on September 18, 1961 by
President Kennedy; Judge Edward Leavy was appointed on March 2, 1987 by President
Reagan. 840 F.2d at 23.
"' Hoffman, supra note 1, at 62.
6 Rubin, supra note 5, at 650.
'
Id.; see also Hoffman, supra note 1, at 64 (finding that as workload of courts
grow, procedural streamlining has increased and court processes have grown more formalized); Clerk's Annual Report, JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS, United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (July 1986-June 1987 at i (providing official statistics).
37 Id.
" Id. at 653.

28

SANTA CLARA L. REV.

39

Id.
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law clerks have less practical experience than judges, and thus,
their decisions may be more logical than wise. Greater delegation of responsibility to law clerks also undermines the public
perception that judges judge. It erodes the constitutional scheme
whereby the President, with advice and consent of the Senate,
40
appoints independent Article III judges to decide cases.
In short, the caseload has transformed the federal appellate
judge from a reflective decision maker to a bureaucrat. 1 Quality
suffers because the judge must delegate responsibility. 2 Some
commentators have suggested that quality also suffers because,
as the job becomes increasingly bureaucratic, it attracts less
qualified candidates.'" In addition, the caseload pressure itself
impairs the quality of a court's work. Almost without exception,
federal judges admit the strain brought on by the caseload. A
problem exists. Conceding that, I am dubious about some of the
proposed remedies to the problem.
II.

DENIAL OF APPEAL OF RIGHT

Chief Justice Rehnquist," among others, 5 has suggested
elimination of the appeal of right to a federal court of appeals, a
right in place in this country for almost a hundred years.'6 Such
a proposal raises serious questions. First, while the Chief Justice
41 Id. at

655.

Hoffman, supra note 1, at 62-63.
42 Rubin, supra note 5, at 652-53; Washy, supra note 31, at 1.
'3 See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, supra note 28, at 28-30 (asserting that increase in number
of judges makes judgeships less prestigious and thus increase in number of judges could
result in deterioration of quality of judges); Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 271-72 (author fearful of less qualified judiciary).
" Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 22.
" See, e.g., Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE
L.J. 62, 107 (1985)(concluding that appeal of right presumptively should be eliminated in
view of extent to which it promotes error correction, procedural fairness, and/or process
satisfaction); Lay, A Proposalfor DiscretionaryReview in Federal Courts of Appeal, 34
Sw. L.J. 1151, 1155 (1981)(finding that in many appeals, only an appearance of justice
results due to the large number of cases and suggesting that courts of appeal should be
allowed discretionary leave to deny review); Wilner, Civil Appeals: Are They Useful in
the Administration of Justice?, 56 GEo. L.J. 417, 419 (1968)(generally discussing usefulness of civil appeals in light of increased number of cases).
" See Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late Century View, 38
S.C.L. REV. 411, 412-17 (1987)(discussing early legislation creating right of appeal).
4'
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has asserted that "we have an obsessive concern that the result
reached in a particular case be the right one," 7 characterizing
the concern as obsessive as a smoke screen. An appellate system
designed to reduce the risk of arbitrary decisionmaking is a goal
worthy of support. As an ideal, appellate adjudication gives the
trial court incentive to uphold ideals of fairness and equality.
Reversal on appeal may not be a severe sanction, but the possibility of review unquestionably gives a trial judge incentive to
conform his conduct with the law. In essence, trial judges are
more reflective because appellate review is possible.4
Second, while some of us may be obsessed with right results,
the Chief Justice misleads his audience when he suggests that
the appellate courts impose consistent standards of "right" results. Indeed, appellate courts may not have enough power to
review results to assure better fact finding. In many instances,
results reached below are beyond meaningful appellate review.
For instance, while jury decisions have traditionally been subject
to limited review, the Supreme Court has restricted the appellate courts' power to review lower court fact finding in discrimination cases."" In addition, at least since Stone v. Powell,5" the
Supreme Court has steadily eroded the role of federal courts in
assuring "right" results in habeas corpus cases. 1 Thus, inconsis-

" Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 9.
" Carrington, supra note 46, at 431; see generally, R. Leflar,
PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS

INTERNAL OPERATING

4, 9-10 (1976)(explaining that appellate function is to

rectify trial court errors but recognizing that hasty decision of appeals provides less as-

surance that parties will receive justice); P. CARRINGTON, D.

MEADOR,

& M.

ROSENBURG,

supra note 1, at 2-4 (asserting that quality of appellate decision is threatened by overwhelming caseload).
'9 See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 285-90 (1982)(holding that
court of appeals may only reverse district court's finding of fact on discriminatory intent
if it concludes that finding is clearly erroneous).
60 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
51 See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1069-1072 (1989)(overruling Linkletter
severely limiting retroactive application of new Supreme Court decisions); United States
& Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 175 (1982)(prisoner launched collateral attack against conviction
due to erroneous jury instruction, which had not been challenged, and court found that
prisoner had fallen short of meeting his burden of showing not merely that trial errors
created possibility of prejudice, but also that such errors worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, injecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions);
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)(holding that defendants were banned from asserting their constitutional claim in federal habeas corpus proceedings because constitu-
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tent results are inevitable in a wide range of cases where appellate courts must defer to a trial court's decision. One wonders
why the Chief Justice is not more concerned about the inequality resulting from limited review. In addition, Chief Justice
Rehnquist seems unconcerned that limiting review of facts
reduces protection of federal rights.5 2
Third, Chief Justice Rehnquist's proposal to eliminate the
right to appeal would "allow [appellate] review only when it is
granted in the discretion of a panel of the appellate court.""3 He
stops short of urging denial of the right of appeal to all litigants
raising certain kinds of claims. Such a proposal would raise serious constitutional questions.5 In any event, the Chief Justice's
proposal is flawed because the panel would have to consider the
merits of the litigant's claim to decide whether to exercise its
discretion. Indeed, I doubt that the panel's deliberations would
be much different from the screening procedures currently in
place in some circuits.5 5 Within the Fifth Circuit, for example,
an increasing number of appeals are decided without oral argument or a published opinion. Unless such a system is administered arbitrarily, the Chief Justice's proposal invites satellite litigation on how the court ought to exercise its discretion.
Finally, making appellate review discretionary raises constitutional problems. Although traditional wisdom suggests that
Congress has plenary power over whether to create lower federal
tional claim was forfeited in state court due to lack of contemporaneous objection to jury
instruction); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977)(emphasizing importance of state's contemporaneous objection rule).
" For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court in Sykes,
and joined Justice O'Connor's majority opinions in Frady and Isaac.
'3 Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 22.
" The extent to which Congress can selectively curtail access to federal courts has
been debated heatedly in the scholarly literature. In 1981, various bills were before Congress which would have selectively denied access to specific classes of litigants. Those
bills produced extensive hearings in Congress. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S.158, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981). For a broad spectrum of views on the constitutionality of selective jurisdiction withdrawal legislation, see generally, Long, Symposium CongressionalLimits on
Federal Court Jurisdiction,27 VILLANOVA L. REv. 893, 895-928, 1030-1041 (1982).
's See Carrington, supra note 46, at 430.
Proceedings,supra note 8, at 549-50 (comments of Judge Rubin); see also, Clerk's
Annual Report, supra note 36, at i (giving percentages of cases decided by summary
disposition).
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courts, 57 the drafters of the Constitution also envisioned mean-

ingful appellate review by the Supreme Court. However, the
modern caseload makes impossible effective review by the Supreme Court; hence, the original function of the Supreme Court
must be shouldered by the courts of appeals.
Professor Eisenberg has developed a similar position. 8 His
article challenged the traditional position advanced by Professors Hart and Wechsler that, because lower federal courts were
not established by Article III, Congress may abolish their jurisdiction as it sees fit.59 Eisenberg argues that the drafters of the
constitution envisioned a critical function for the judiciary. Of
course, its primary role was as a check on the power of co-equal
branches within our tripartite system. 0 However, delegates to
the Constitutional Convention also envisioned other functions of
a national judiciary. Specifically, federal courts "achieve uniformity of decision on questions of national concern . . . [and

help] ensure that federal interests take precedence over those of
any particular state in matters of federal competence."" The judiciary was "intended, perhaps above all else, to be able to hear
and do justice in all cases within its jurisdiction," and was conceived of "as [an] instrument for the protection of individuals."62 Relying on the Federalist papers, Eisenberg argues that
"[tihis emphasis . . . strongly suggests that the Framers in-

tended that national tribunals would hear each case within the
federal judicial power" 8
Admittedly, the foregoing analysis, by itself, does not compel the conclusion that appellate review is constitutionally required. One might argue that, even assuming a federal court
must be available to a federal right holder, it need not be an
appeals court. After all, Congress did not create the courts of
57

See generally, M.

REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF

JUDICIAL POWER, 21-34 (1980)(discussing Congressional power to ordain and establish

lower federal courts).
" Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974).
" Id. at 501-04.
60 Id. at 505.

61Id.
11 Id. at 506.
" Id. at 507.
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appeal for a hundred years."
However, Professor Eisenberg would probably respond by
saying that such an argument overlooks the Supreme Court's capacity during that early period of history. As Eisenberg contends
" . . . the Founding Fathers felt that the right to appellate review by the Supreme Court would be sufficient to ensure that all
litigants with cases within the federal constitutional jurisdiction
would have their cases heard by a national tribunal. 8' 5 Delegates
to the Convention expected the Supreme Court to check erroneous state court decisions in what were expected to be only a few
federal cases."8 Given these early expectations that federal cases
would be infrequent, it was originally thought that the Supreme
Court could exercise meaningful appellate review. Because lower
federal courts were not mandated, "[tihe federal forum may
have been limited to appellate review, but it was to be available
in all cases. ' 67 Thus, under this original view, any litigant with a
federal claim would have access to appellate review in a federal
appellate court even if the action were originally tried in state
court.6 8
The Supreme Court has never had to decide the constitutionality of wholesale withdrawal of federal appellate review, but
it seems clear that the Founding Fathers envisioned meaningful
review in a federal appellate court. To that end, it must be conceded that courts of appeals are now essential because the modern Supreme Court is no longer able to perform its constitutionally defined role as appellate arbiter of cases arising under
federal law.6 9
Carrington, supra note 36, at 414.
6 Eisenberg, supra note 58, at 508.
Id. at 508-09.
e Id. at 509.
e Id. at 508.

Id.
One is tempted to ask how the framers could both intend the federal judiciary to be capable of hearing all cases within its jurisdiction and at the same
time not explicitly incorporate inferior federal courts into the constitutional
scheme. The answer is that the Founding Fathers felt that the right to appellate review by the Supreme Court would be sufficient to ensure that all litigants with case within the federal constitutional jurisdiction would have their
cases heard by a national tribunal. This faith in the availability of Supreme
Court review was in evidence at the Constitutional Convention. Rutledge em-
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The Supreme Court's legislative courts decisions lend additional support to the argument that Article III judicial review is
constitutionally mandated, at least in some circumstances. For
over fifty years, often aiming at greater efficiency, Congress has
given non-Article III adjudicators jurisdiction over cases within
the competence of Article III courts."' As the caseload pressure
becomes more acute, Congress is likely to experiment further
with informal adjudication. Thus, the Supreme Court's legislative court decisions attempt to identify outer limits for such
experimentation.
At one extreme, some noted scholars have argued that the
Constitution contemplated only Article III courts, making invalid any alternative methods of adjudication within the federal
system.7 As observed by Professor Charles Allan Wright, Article
III "would seem to be a very clear declaration that the judicial
power . . . can only be conferred on courts where the judges enjoy tenure for good behavior, and assurance against diminution
of salary, protections that the Framers, and all succeeding generations, have thought of vital importance in preserving judicial

independence.

'72

However, as early as 1829, the Supreme Court began eroding that clear declaration. In American Insurance Co. v.
Canter," the Court upheld a judgment of a territorial court
manned by non-Article III judges. The case involved the validity

ployed it as a rationale for not including any lower federal courts in the constitutional scheme. Luther Martin explained in his fellow Marylanders that he
did not think that lower federal courts were necessary because, "by giving an
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the general government
would have a sufficient check over [state] decisions and security for the enforcing of their laws ....
Id.
70 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 42 (although Congress created legislative courts
early in our history, "[tihe modern expansion of the 'legislative court' concept began in
1923 .... ").
" See, e.g., id. at 39-40; Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DuKE L.J. 197, 229 (1983)(discussing effect of
Northern Pipeline decision which held questioned exercise of jurisdiction of Bankruptcy
Courts unconstitutional because their judge lacked Article III's protection of salary and
tenure).
" C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 39-40.
" 1 Pet. 511, 7 L. Ed. 242 (1829).
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of a sale of salvaged cargo, a matter one would have assumed to
be within admiralty jurisdiction. 4 The Court held that territorial courts were not "constitutional courts, in which the judicial
power conferred by the Constitution on the general government
can17 5be deposited. [Territorial courts] are incapable of receiving
it.
According to the Canter Court, Congress created such
courts based on power found outside Article III (in this instance
power over the territories) and that found in the "necessary and
76
proper" clause.
Upon close scrutiny, the Court's legislative courts doctrine,
from its beginning in Canter, seems incoherent. That the Constitution gives Congress power over the territories proves too
much. For example, the Constitution also places power over interstate commerce in Congress, 7 and yet Congress presumably
could not create legislative courts to resolve all disputes arising
in interstate commerce. In addition, Chief Justice Marshall's assertion that territorial courts are incapable of receiving Article
III power also makes no sense.7 8 Indeed, the Supreme Court, capable of receiving only matters within Article III judicial power,
has repeatedly reviewed decisions by legislative courts like the
7 9 Hence, the matter must be within
territorial court in Canter.
Article 111.80
The legislative court concept has a history of inconsistent
rationales and results even when the Court has had to decide
whether judges on a particular court were Article III judges., To

74 U.S. Const., art. III, § 2. Elsewhere in Canter, Chief Justice Marshall recognized
that were such a case tried outside the territories, it would be within the admiralty jurisdiction. Canter, 1 Pet. at 545.
75 Canter, 1 Pet. at 546.

76 Id.
77

For an interesting discussion of that problem, see Resnik, supra note 17, at 584-

92.
See C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 41-42.
" Id., citing Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 3 L. Ed. 232
(1810).
8 See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962)(Justice Harlan's effort to explain
apparent contradiction).
" Compare O'Donoghue v. United Sates, 289 U.S. 516 (1933)(District of Columbia
Courts held to be Article III courts) with Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438
(1929)(extended dicta, District of Columbia courts characterized as legislative courts).
On the Court's shifting rationales, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 42-50. Professor
71
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be sure, Supreme Court decisions concerning the topic have ignored the Constitution's express language.8 ' However, while the
Court has often abandoned its own rationale, a3 it has been consistently pragmatic. Its decisions have almost uniformly upheld
Congress' choice of less formal adjudication in spite of Article
III's express language.8 4 Indeed, from a pragmatic perspective
one can only imagine what life would be like in our nation's capital without administrative agencies handling vast numbers of
what otherwise look like Article III cases and controversies. 5
Justice Brennan attempted to give coherence to the doctrine
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 6 the only major decision by the Court denying Congress authority to create legislative courts. However, Brennan's effort
failed to secure a majority of the Court and thus resulted in an
obviously weakened plurality opinion. 7 At any rate, Northern
Pipeline struck down the 1978 Bankruptcy Act as a violation of
Article III. In doing so, Brennan first grouped many of the
Court's earlier decisions into three categories: (1) territorial
courts and local District of Columbia courts, where "'Congress
has the entire control . . . for every purpose of government;' a88
(2) courts martial, like territorial courts, where the Constitution
gives "extraordinary control over the precise subject matter at
issue;' ' s9 and (3)public rights cases, a doctrine which "may be
explained in part by reference to the traditional principle of soV-

Wright specifically observes the absence of a "clear analytical answer as to when a court
is 'legislative' . . . ."F. Wright, supra note 14, at 48.
8,C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 39-40; see also Resnik, supra note 17, at 585.

*' C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 42-50. See also M. REDISH, supra note 57, at 40-51;
D. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 39-44 (1981).

Resnik, supra note 17, at 586.
See Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101
HARV. L. REV. 915, 925 (1988)(asserting that regulatory agencies and welfare offices constitute modern "administrative state").
6 458 U.S. 50 (1982)(plurality opinion by Brennan, J.)
81 Justice O'Connor and Rehnquist concurred, but emphasized that they did not
decide the broad question answered by the plurality, "whether the assignment by Congress to bankruptcy judges of the jurisdiction granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 by § 241(a) of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violates art. III of the Constitution." Northern Pipeline Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 89 (1982).
" Id. at 65 (quoting Kendall v. United States, 12 U.S. 524, 619 (1838)).
89 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 66.
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ereign immunity," 90 which allows Congress to "attach conditions
to its consent to be sued,"9' 1 and which does not violate separation of power concerns because public rights cases involve "prerogatives . . . reserved to the political Branches of Government."9 For all that, Brennan's three categories accounted for
only some of the cases in which Congress has created non-Article
III adjudicatory bodies. For instance, the plurality recognized
the validity of Crowell v. Benson9 3 and United States v. Raddatz.9 4 Both of these cases involved fact finding by a non-Article
III adjudicator (a compensation commissioner in Crowell, and a
magistrate in Raddatz).9 5 However, neither case fits the plurality's three categories in which Congress is given discretion to
place the case in a legislative court.96
Brennan's plurality opinion described Crowell, the classic
administrative agency case, and Raddatz as cases where the
non-Article III adjudicator was merely an adjunct to an Article
III court.9 7 The plurality characterized the role of those non-Article III adjudicators narrowly. It identified Crowell as a case in
which Congress created a substantive federal right.9 8 According
to Brennan, when Congress creates a right, it "possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right
may be adjudicated - including the assignment to an adjunct of
some functions historically performed by judges" 99 Brennan relied on Crowell's argument that juries and special masters fulfill
the fact finding function even in Article III courts. '00 However,
Brennan emphasized that even where Congress creates adjuncts,
it cannot remove "'the essential attributes' of judicial power"1 01
from Article III courts. For that reason, Northern Pipeline's

9

Id. at 67.

91 Id.
92

93
94

95
"
"'
98

99
,o
1

Id.
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
447 U.S. 667 (1980).
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 78-79.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 78.
Id.
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plurality underscored that the scheme in Crowell was valid because "full authority [was reserved] to the [Article III] court to
deal with matters of law."' 2
Brennan's plurality recognized that Congress had less leeway in entrusting adjuncts with judicial responsibility in cases
involving constitutional rights than in those cases involving congressionally created rights, a distinction which was rationalized
as a means of maintaining the separation of powers requirements.1 03 Congress is within its province in creating substantive
rights, but ". . . when the right. . . is not of congressional creation . . . substantial inroads into functions that have traditionally been performed by the Judiciary cannot be characterized
merely as incidental extensions of power to define rights that it
has created."' 0 ' The plurality emphasized that Raddatz upheld
the Magistrate Act as constitutional because "'[t]he authority
- and the responsibility - to make an informed, final determination . . . remains with the judge.' "105
The common denominator in Crowell and Raddatz is the
availability of review by an Article III judge. To be sure, partial
shifting of litigation to non-Article III courts is in vogue because
1 06
it allows less expensive, more expeditious disposition of cases.
But, as indicated by Brennan's plurality opinion in Northern
Pipeline, reliance on an adjunct is constitutional only where an
107
Article III court has review power.
Brennan's tidy distinctions in Northern Pipeline failed to
command a majority of the Court. Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor concurred, emphasizing that they did not address the
broad dispute over "whether the assignment by Congress to
bankruptcy judges of the jurisdiction granted in . . . the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violates Art. III . . . .-8 Instead, they fo-

102
103

Id. at 81 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54).
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81-82.

" Id. at 84.
Id. at 81 (quoting United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 682).
I" See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 14-18 (arguing for less expensive
adjudication).
107 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83-84 (critical analysis turned on review by district court).
'" Id. at 89.
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cused on the state law contract dispute between the parties that
would not have been before the Bankruptcy Court but for the
fact that the plaintiff had already filed for reorganization under
the Bankruptcy Act."0 9
Justice White dissented in Northern Pipeline.'" After extensive review of the plurality opinion and prior case law, he
concluded that "Article III is not to be read out of the Constitution; rather, it should be read as expressing one value that must
be balanced against competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities.""' Justice White then identified the values
to be balanced: the strength of the legislative interest should be
weighed against the burden placed on Article III values."' Like
the plurality opinion, Justice White recognized that appellate review by an Article III court might save a statute creating nonArticle III courts:
• ..Crowell ...suggests that the presence of appellate review
by an Art. III court will go a long way toward insuring a proper
separation of powers. Appellate review of the decisions of legislative courts, like appellate review of state-court decisions, provides a firm check on the ability of the political institutions of
government to ignore or transgress constitutional limits on
their own authority." 3
Justice White stopped short of concluding that appellate review by an Article III court is a necessary condition in a legislative court scheme, but his dissenting opinion underscored the
importance of review: ". . . a scheme of Art. I courts that provides for appellate review by Art. III courts should be substantially less controversial than a legislative attempt entirely to
avoid judicial review in a constitutional court.""" In the end, despite Justice Brennan's efforts to line up and limit the Court's
legislative court decisions, the White approach has prevailed. Indeed, the Court's two post-Northern Pipeline decisions rejected

09

1

Id. at 90.
Id. at 92.

.. Id. at 113.
112

Id.

"'

Id. at 115.

114

Id.
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the plurality's approach in favor of Justice White's balancing approach urged by Justice White in his Northern Pipeline
5
dissent.1
The first of these post-Northern Pipeline decisions,
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.," 6 rejected
a challenge to statutorily imposed binding arbitration. The
Thomas dispute centered around the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act" 7 which compelled companies to share
research data, but provided for compensation for its use. 1 18 Congress mandated that disputes concerning such compensation be
decided by arbitration with limited judicial review." 9 In a decision probably best understood in context with a caseload crisis
mentality, the Court rejected "rigid and formalistic restraints on
the ability of Congress to adopt innovative measures such as negotiation and arbitration with respect to rights created by a regulatory scheme."' 20 Undoubtedly, the majority had in mind Justice Brennan's categories in his Northern Pipeline plurality
decision. The Thomas Court relied, in part, on the availability of
review by an Article III court to uphold the constitutionality of
Congress's arbitration scheme.' 2 '
The second post-Northern Pipeline case, Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 2 2 securely put in place the
approach advocated by Justice White in his Northern Pipeline
dissent. Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 23 the CFTC
could resolve reparation claims brought by customers against
commodity brokers. 2 4 Regulations promulgated by the FTC
permitted the Commission to hear counterclaims "aris[ing] out

1 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
473 U.S. 568 (1985).
.. U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq. (1982).
II
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 571-72.
" Id. at 573-74.
110 Id.
at 594.
Id. at 592 (under circumstances of case, review afforded preserved appropriate
exercise of judicial function).
22478 U.S. 833 (1986).
123 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
"' Id. at § 18.
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of the same transaction or occurrence."12 5 Those counterclaims
included state-law contract actions for brokerage fees. 2 '
In Schor, the Court distinguished between "personal" and
'
"structural" interests found in Article III. 27
The Court rejected
adherence to "formalistic and unbending rules" and relied instead on various factors.' 2" Among these factors was the "extent
to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are reserved
to Article III courts .... 11' That is, "a given congressional decision to authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a
non-Article III tribunal [may] impermissibly threaten the institutional integrity of the judicial branch ... .""o The Court
considered separation of power concerns, but found them de
minimis in Schor. Critical to its decisions was the fact that Congress had not withdrawn a class of cases from judicial
cognizance."3 '
As important as separation of power concerns, the Schor
Court recognized an individual litigant's right to an Article III
forum. Grounded in Article III, but resembling a due process argument, the Schor analysis notes that fairness to a litigant is
advanced by having an independent adjudicator. 1 32 In Schor,
that factor was not present because "the decision to invoke [the]
forum is left entirely to the parties .... ,,Is Thus, while Schor's
ad hoc balancing process may lack certainty, it suggests that
meaningful review by an Article III court may be necessary to
assure fairness in some cases.' 3 '
Professor Fallon has recently argued that the Court's methodology in Thomas and Schor "is underdeveloped, its standards
17 C.F.R. § 12.19(b) (1988).
,28 Schor, 478 U.S. at 840-41 (reversal of lower court ruling that CEA lacked juris12'

diction to hear such claims).
127 Id. at 848.
112 Id.
at 851.
129

Id.

130 Id.

...Id. at 854.
132 Id.
at 848 (Article III does not confer absolute right to plenary consideration of
every nature of claim by Article III court).
133 Id. at 855.
124 Id.
at 856 (Art. III, Sec. 1 "serves ... to safeguard litigants 'right to have claims
decided before judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government'" (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
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obscure"' 3 and calls for "increased clarity and coherence. "' 16
Fallon analyzes as two separate lines of precedent the legislative
court cases and the adjunct or administrative agency cases.137 He
urges that the Court reject the first tradition involving legislative courts:
As between the two traditions, the second is much more respectful of Article III. The first, which does not even demand
Supreme Court review of the judgments of non-Article III adjudicators, provides no internal guarantee against a frightening
displacement of Article III courts. By building upon the more
promising line of analysis associated with Crowell, an appellate
review theory uses precedent not merely as a source of constraints on the use of non-Article III tribunals, but as a fountain of normative guidance.'
Fallon believes that effective appellate review "can provide an
effective check against politically influenced adjudication, arbitrary and self-interested decisionmaking and other evils that the
separation of power was designed to prevent." 3 In addition,
Fallon also agrees that appellate review assures fairness to
litigants. 4 '
Since Professor Fallon readily admits that his theory "may
be controversial" because it is inconsistent with the rationale of
one line of cases,' 4 I feel inclined to disagree with him in two
minor details. First, no consistent line of reasoning is present in
the legislative court cases." 2 Justice Brennan's Northern Pipeline analysis attempted to order the field, but was quickly rejected.14 3 Nonetheless, Northern Pipeline dramatized the need
for and lack of coherence in the field. It also merged the two
lines of precedent: according to Justice Brennan, unless Congress legislated within one of three narrow categories, it could

135

Fallon, supra note 85, at 933.

186 Id.
13,
131
139
140

Id. at 946.
Id. at 947.

Id.
Id.

Id.
See authorities cited supra note 83 and accompanying text.
.. See discussion supra notes 86-134 and accompanying text.
1

14'
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create an adjunct adjudicator only if significant control over that
adjunct remained in an Article III court.""'
Second, since Northern Pipeline, the Court has continued
its efforts to order the law. "1 5 The Court has not explicitly held
that appellate review is a necessary condition in schemes relying
on non-Article III tribunals, but its recent cases point in that
direction because of reasons articulated by Professor Fallon: "To
the extent that questions of fidelity to legal norms can be immunized from judicial inquiry, separation of powers values are part
at risk. The fairness interests of litigants may also be compromised insofar as non-Article III federal adjudicators are tempted
by opportunities for self-aggrandizement or are subject to political or other pressures."" 6
Schor and Thomas abandoned the analysis developed in a
long line of cases. " 7 That analysis indeed may be in need of reexamination. However, Schor and Thomas can best be understood as the Court's efforts to give Congress substantial leeway
in finding solutions to the caseload crisis. Brennan's opinion in
Northern Pipeline created doubt about the constitutional validity of non-Article III adjudicators.14 8 But Thomas, Schor, and
Brennan's Northern Pipeline opinion nonetheless have a common thread - a belief that Congress's ability to place cases in
non-Article III courts may depend on the availability of at least
some review by an Article III court.' 9
Consequently, proposals to abandon the right to appeal
must be examined in that context. Pressure is on Congress to
create alternatives to Article III adjudication,' 50 but the ability

"' Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 73 (while independent courts are not required for
all federal adjudications where Art. III does apply, Art. I is subject to its provisions).
14
See supra notes 115-34 and accompanying text.
"' Fallon, supra note 85, at 950-51.
17 While that analysis was often inconsistent, the legislative court cases never articulated a balancing test. Even Justice White, the proponent of the balancing test, recognized that ". . . a balancing approach stands behind many of the decisions upholding
Art. I courts." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 113-14.
' See P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-SATE
144 (1987)(suggesting that other legislative courts would violate Article III if
the Northern Pipeline plurality opinion were applied stringently).
See supra notes 86-134 and accompanying text.
180 See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 14-18.
RELATIONS
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to move adjudication out of federal district courts is contingent
on review of the adjudication by some other Article III court.
Thus, in a wide range of cases, the Court ironically must preserve effective review by an Article III court in order to achieve
its other goal of lessening the caseload of the district courts.
Justice Rehnquist's proposal to abandon the appeal of right
is bad policy. Determining which cases are worthy of consideration would either produce time-consuming satellite litigation or
would lead to an arbitrary selection process. 15 1 In addition, such
a scheme also raises significant constitutional questions.
Throughout our history, a federal right holder has almost always
had a federal appellate court available to review its case. Professor Eisenberg has argued persuasively that the Framers intended the Supreme Court to hear such cases and that absent
such review, Congress cannot cut off access to lower federal
courts.1 52
While the Court has never resolved whether Congress can
curtail the right of appeal, it has emphasized that Congress'
power to place cases within non-Article III courts may turn on
the availability of appellate review. 15Desire for less expensive
and more expeditious adjudication may thus make appellate review by an Article III tribunal a constitutional requirement in
an increasing number of cases.
III.

JUDGE POSNER'S ANALYSIS: CRISIS AND REFORM

Many commentators have proposed reforms intended to
cure the caseload crisis' " This section focuses on Judge Posner's proposals developed in The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform15 5 and urges caution in evaluating Judge Posner's proposals

for reform.
Judge Posner argues that federal courts are in need of dramatic reform and attempts to argue that his proposals are politi"' See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
'.

See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.

.' See supra notes 70-149 and accompanying text.
,54 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
"" See supra note 15.
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cally neutral. 56 However, as developed below, no one familiar
with Posner's considerable writings will be surprised that his
book is rife with political value judgments. Indeed, some of his
proposed reforms would unravel liberal reforms made possible
by access to federal courts.1 57
Judge Posner uses several chapters of his book to establish
that a crisis exists. 5 8 He argues that federal courts of appeals
"cannot be expanded, beyond a point that seems to have been
reached, without creating extremely poor working conditions at
the court of appeals level (by making each such court too large
to function effectively) or placing unreasonable demands on the
Supreme Court.' 15 9 Posner concludes that the "crisis in quantity
has endangered the quality of federal justice."'"6
However, in response to this crisis, Posner rejects creation
6
of additional courts of appeals, the addition of new judges,1 1
and the proposed creation of a super court of appeals. 6 2 In response it should be said that while these ideas may be flawed,
one committed to federal rights might be willing to accept some
of the disadvantages of such alternatives to preserve adjudication by independent Article III judges. But in reality Posner
does not want to preserve the current status of federal rights,
and this is reflected in his proposed "procedural" reforms. 6 3
Short of fuller "more radical measures,''64 Posner suggests
several reforms to bring the crisis under control. For example, he
suggests increasing filing fees and the minimum jurisdictional
amount. (Since publication of Posner's book, Congress has done
just that. Effective May 18, 1989, the minimum amount in controversy for federal diversity jurisdiction is $50,000.) He advocates that the prevailing party be awarded reasonable attorney's

166

See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 208-09 (arguing that judicial restraint is

politically neutral).
...See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
R. POSNER, supra notes 15, at 59-166.
'5 Id. at 317.
160 Id. at 318.
''
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 162-66.
..
S Id. at 319-20.
16 Id.
at 319.
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fees. 165 He also favors "the expansion of appellate capacity
within federal administrative agencies"1'66 and a specialized tax
67
court of appeals with exclusive jurisdiction over tax appeals.'
Most controversial are suggestions that would undo many judicial developments over the past three decades. For instance, he
argues for:
a rededication by federal judges to the principles of judicial
self-restraint and institutional responsibility . . . , a realloca-

tion of judicial responsibilities from the federal courts to the
state courts, including [among other suggestions] . . .renunci-

ation of habeas corpus jurisdiction to determine the innocence
of a state criminal defendant, and finally a greater realism
about the interpretation of statutes, and the Constitution and
about the economic foundations of many of the common law
principles that the federal courts elaborate and enforce.'""
Posner's "reforms" are undeniably political, dressed up as
solutions to the caseload crisis. Having convinced us that we
have a crisis, Judge Posner harkens back not only to the place of
the collegial judiciary but also presumably to the values of
judges willing to ignore the fourteenth amendment and early
civil rights legislation, a nice "side effect" of curing the caseload
crisis. '
Of course, Posner's book has produced critical commentary. 170 Much of the criticism has focused on the political agenda
evident below the surface of his procedural reforms.17 ' For ex-

1'5

Id.

Ise

Id.

Id.
"I Id. at 319-20.
169 See Beermann, Crisis? What Crisis?, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1383, 1389-1405 (1986).
Beermann concludes that Posner's efforts to characterize "these federal jurisdiction
problems as ones of forum allocation and economic analysis of externalities sanitizes
them beyond recognition." Id. at 1405.
170 See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 169, at 1389-1405; Varat, Economic Ideology and
the Federal Judicial Task, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 649 (1986); Estreicher, Conserving the Federal Judiciary, 84 MICH. L. REV. 569 (1986); Redish, The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and the Importance of Analyzing Legal Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1378
(1985).
11 See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 169, at 1389 ("Posner's book completely lacks
any discussion . . . of his . . .proposed reforms . . .Any discussion of major reforms to
an important institution is incomplete without consideration of social consequences.");
167
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ample, in responding to Posner's suggestion to reduce review of
civil rights and habeas corpus cases, Professor Redish observes
that "these suggestions . . . are made in a discussion of achieving the goal of docket reduction, despite the fact that, as Posner
acknowledges . . ., broader concerns of federalism are at stake
in making decisions whether or not to remove such cases from
1 72
the federal courts.
Similarly, Redish accuses Posner of ignoring important
value judgments implicit in the allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal courts.1 73 Posner argues that forcing a
litigant to adjudicate a federal right in state court is acceptable
in light of history (Congress did not create general federal question jurisdiction until 1875) and of possible review by the Supreme Court. 17 4 Posner answers concerns about the state court's
inability or unwillingness to protect federal rights by asserting
that "today the state courts in all areas of the country can...
be trusted to protect the innocent of whatever race, creed, national origin, or income, with exceptions too few and isolated to
17 5
justify federal judicial intervention.
Posner "disregards both the relatively minimal chance of
Supreme Court review and the dramatic shifts in the role of the
federal courts since 1875. ''117 His trust in state courts ignores
their "lack of. . . independence from political branches of state
government and the lack of uniformity in interpretation of federal rights that would result from increased state adjudication. ' 177 Urging a shift of cases from federal to state court attacks an article of liberal faith. Posner must be aware that his
proposal, if accepted, would reverse many of the gains made by
civil rights and other liberal groups over the past thirty-five

Varat, supra note 170, at 673 ("Posner may be insufficiently aware of his own ideology
and its effect on his social science analysis.") Estreicher, supra note 170, at 570 ("The
unstated thesis of this book seems to be: the need to husband or 'conserve' federal judicial resources requires a truly 'conservative' agenda for the federal judiciary.").
' Redish, supra note 170, at 1389-90.
...Id. at 1387, 1391.
R. POSNER, supra note 15, a 133-34.
"'
Id. at 187.
170 Redish, supra note 170, at 1391.
177

Id.
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years.178
Posner also urges greater judicial self-restraint."' He analyzes various kinds of self-restraint, "[i.e.] the judge's trying to
limit his court's power over other government institutions. "180
Posner is concerned that federal courts will use up their political
and judicial capital.1 8 1 Posner asserts that self-restraint "is not a
liberal or conservative position, because it is independent of the
politics that the other institutions of government happen to be
following. It will produce liberal or conservative outcomes depending on whether the courts in question are at the moment
1
more or less liberal than those institutions.""
In a different
place and time, that point may be well-taken, but its application
today has a distinct conservative political flavor. 18 3 For instance,
a review of only a few self-restraint cases demonstrates the Supreme Court's use of prudential doctrines there to prevent litigants from asserting federal rights in federal court. Widely criticized as unprincipled,1 8 4 the Court's standing cases are
illustrative.
Prior to the mid-1970s, plaintiffs found standing a low
threshold. The Court denied standing in Sierra Club v. Morton18 5 because the plaintiff, a highly regarded environmental
group, failed to allege that any of its members used the Mineral
King Valley, the area that the Sierra Club sought to protect
from commercial development. But the Court's standing requirement was viewed as a minor procedural bar, easily remedied under liberal federal pleading requirements,1 8 a fact con-

178

See generally, Beermann, supra note 169.

179

R.

POSNER,

supra note 15, at 198-222.

80 Id. at 208.
1 Id. at 205.
182 Id. at 209-09.
183 See id. at 209, n.25 (discussing current literature advocating return to judicial
activism whereby judges freely overturned legislation regulation economic activity).
184 See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 65 ("... the decisions on standing
are not
easy to reconcile on their facts. Nor has the theory on standing questions been much
more satisfactory.") See also Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970)("Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such."); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.18 (Supp. 1965)("... the
Supreme Court's law of standing to sue [is] largely worthless as such.").
185

I1

405 U.S. 727 (1972).
FED.

R. CIV. P. 15. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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firmed a year later in United States v. SCRAP. 8 7 In fact, during
the early 1970s, commentators could argue that the standing requirement ought to be satisfied whenever the plaintiff had sufficient institutional concern and resources to pursue litigation vigorously. 8 ' Thus, public interest groups normally would have
standing if they could assure "concrete adverseness." As long as
other Article III requirements were met, an ideological plaintiff
could challenge a wide array of governmental action. Therefore,
although the Court never formally adopted such a position, 18 9
this lenient view found support in the case law. 9 '
Since that time, however, the Court essentially has adopted
a rigorous approach to standing and held that injury in fact is
"an irreducible constitutional minimum"' 9' for standing. Indeed, the cases since the mid-1970s signal a "major change in
direction" from liberalized standing rules. 192 For instance, lack
of standing has been used to prevent consideration of several
hard questions pressed by liberal organizations. For example, in
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,' s the
Court barred a group opposed to the war in Vietnam from litigating the legality of Congressmen holding positions in the
Armed Forces Reserve. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization,' the Court found that the litigants lacked
standing to challenge a new IRS regulation allowing hospitals to
qualify as charities even though they did not provide free emer-

199

412 U.S. 669 (1973).
See, e.g., Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court -

A Functional Analysis, 86

HARv. L.

REV. 645 (1973). See also K. DAVIS, supra note 184, at 208-94.
,' That position was specifically rejected in Valley Forge Christian College v. Amer-

icans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
90 Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1380-83 (1973)(discussing extent to which "injury in fact" is constitutionally mandated). Much confusion resulted from the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962) which emphasized that "the gist of the question of standing" was
whether a plaintiff alleged "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.").
191 Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 67.
193

418 U.S. 208 (1974).

"' 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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gency treatment to the indigent. In Warth v. Seldin,'95 the
Court found that a wide array of plaintiffs, including prospective
builders and prospective tenants, lacked standing to challenge a
community's restrictive zoning ordinances. The Court also has
used standing to bar an attack on a statute permitting disposal
of surplus government property to a religious institution.1 9 6 In
Allen v. Wright, 9 ' the Court used the standing doctrine to avoid
deciding whether segregated schools were charitable institutions
within the meaning of the tax code.
The recent emergence of this strict standing requirement
has coincided with the "public law litigation" revolution in
which "lawsuits were designed to coerce systematic reform or
curtailment of government actions . . .'"9' The rigorous new
standing requirement, perhaps asserted under the guise of neutral self-restraint, has barred consideration of the merits of the
underlying dispute in these cases even in instances where no
other plaintiff was available to challenge a constitutional violation. 99 By contrast, in Duke Power Co. v. CarolinaEnvironmental Study Group, Inc.,2 00 the Court relaxed the standing requirements in order to hear a challenge to the Price-Anderson Act.20 1
The environmental group and individual plaintiffs challenged
the act's limitation of liability for a nuclear accident as a violation of due process and equal protection. The Court granted
standing, only to find the act constitutional. 0 As observed by
Justice Stephens in his concurring opinion, the majority based
standing on a delicate "string of contingencies. 0 3 The decision
might be explained by the Court's desire to dispel uncertainty
regarding the constitutionality of the act, but not by principled
and consistent application of its own standard.20 4

422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472.
468 U.S. 737 (1984).
198 P. Low and J. JEFFRIES, supra note 148, at 15 (discussing Chayes, "Forward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court," 96 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1982)).
1
Reservists Committee, 418 U.S. at 227.
200 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
201 42 U.S.C.A. sec. 2210 (West 1973).
202 Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 82-94.
,,

,o Id. at 102 (Stephens, J., concurring).
Id. at 103.
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Abstention poses a similar problem. Abstention is "judgemade . . . not authorized by congressional action, and in fact
directly [in contravention of] unambiguous congressional directives . . to adjudicate cases brought to enforce substantive federal rights."2 0 5 Like standing, abstention and the related "Our
Federalism"' 6 doctrine have been invoked frequently to bar federal courts from hearing cases involving federal rights favored by
the liberal community.
Younger v. Harris0 7 and its progeny demonstrate the point
most clearly. However, in order to fully understand the impact
of Younger, one must first gain some perspective by analyzing
Dombrowski v. Pfister,0 8 the earlier precedent which Younger
supplanted. In Dombrowski, the Court faced abusive efforts by
state officials to frustrate civil rights organizers. While the facts
were extreme, 0 9 the Court's holding was not tied to those facts
and appeared to allow litigants free access to federal court to
enjoin state prosecutions that might chill exercise of first
amendment rights. Thus the Court held:
A criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression usually involves imponderables and contingencies that
themselves may inhibit the full exercise of first amendment
freedoms ....
When the statute also has an overbroad
sweep. . . the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those
precious rights may be critical... The assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded in such cases.2" '
This quoted language applies in any case involving a threatened
prosecution of a person alleging that a statute's overbreadth impairs first amendment rights. In other words, the Dombrowski
Court did not narrow its holding to its unsavory facts.211
Redish, supra note 170, at 1399.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971). For a critical discussion of Our
Federalism, see M. Redish, supra note 57, at 291-321.
20

204

207

401 U.S. 37.

380 U.S. 479 (1965).
For an interesting personal account of the events leading to the Supreme Court's
decision, see A. KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIMAL 209-55 (1983).
210 380 U.S. at 486.
21 See M. REDISH, supra note 57, at 293-94.
208

204
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Unfortunately, whatever the Dombrowski Court might have
intended is irrelevant after Justice Black rewrote Dombrowski in
2 12 Younger restricted
Younger v. Harris.
access to federal court
even where a litigant alleged a chilling effect on free expression.
The Court assumed as it subsequently held in Mitchum v. Foster21 3 that section 1983211 was an express exception to the AntiInjunction Act. 15 Thus, the conclusion would follow that Congress gave the federal courts jurisdiction over claims like those
raised in Younger and its companion cases. Nevertheless, despite the lack of any statutory authority for declining such jurisdictions, the Younger Court indeed refused to exercise jurisdiction.2 16 Despite being championed as a form of judicial restraint,
Younger represents a form of back door judicial activism. 17 As
observed by Professor Redish, abstention amounts to "a blatant
- and indefensible - usurpation of judicial authority." 18
Younger's analysis of Dombrowski has generated strong
criticism:
... Justice Black... disposed of [Dombrowski] with a
degree of disingenuosness remarkable even by Supreme Court
standards... The Younger Court's approach to Dombrowski
...misleadingly... dismiss[ed] what was in reality the decision's central thrust - recognition of the special nature of first
amendment claims and the danger of a chilling effect caused
by relegating a litigant's constitutional challenge
to a criminal
219
defense - as just so much aberrational dicta.
Younger compels a person to abandon his first amendment
rights to avoid prosecution or to litigate his claim along the long
road through state court and only then to a federal district court
in habeas proceedings, proceedings which Posner incidentally

'"

401 U.S. 37 (1971).
407 U.S. 225 (1972).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
216 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1978).
216 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
117 See Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 Y.E L.J. 71, 74-75 (1984).
218 Id. at 72.
29 M. REDISH, supra note 57, at 297.
213
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suggests should be dramatically curtailed.2 20
Moreover, the Court has continued to extend "Our Federalism" in post-Younger cases. For example, Younger applies even
if a litigant seeks non-coercive declaratory relief.22 1 Presumably,
declaratory relief does not create the same friction with state
court judges as does injunctive relief.2 22 The Court has also applied Younger in civil proceedings in which the state is a
party.2 Unlike criminal defendants, civil litigants cannot avail
themselves of a federal forum through habeas corpus proceedings and instead must rely on the severely limited chance of review by the Supreme Court.
At some point in the future, judicial self-restraint may frustrate a conservative agenda.2 4 However, that was not true during the tenure of Chief Justice Burger and despite characterization of Chief Justice Rehnquist as a conservative opposed to
judicial activism, he has fully endorsed cases like Younger.2 25
Thus, Judge Posner's assertion that self-restraint is a politically
neutral and a worthy method for attacking the burgeoning
caseload is a hollow and thinly veiled attempt to advance his
conservative philosophy.
All in all, my focus on Posner's book is intended to demonstrate a straightforward point. Concern about the caseload crisis
can be manipulated to impair the liberal reforms accomplished
only because of access to the federal courts. Posner's faith in
equivalent justice in state courts 226 flies in the face of the widely
held belief that federal courts are sympathetic and expert in adjudicating federal rights.22 7
22. R. POSNER,
221

supra note 15, at 187-88.

Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).

See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). But see M. REDISH, supra
note 57, at 303-04.
223 See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979)(Younger applied to federal suit to
enjoin operation of Texas' judicial protection of minors); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977)(Younger barred federal action against state contempt proceedings); Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977)(Younger applied to federal cation brought to enjoin
state civil proceedings to recoup fraudulently obtained welfare payments).
224 R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 208-09.
222 See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979)(opinion by Rehnquist, J.); Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)(opinion by Rehnquist, J.).
220 R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 187.
227 Redish, supra note 170, at 1390-91.
222
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Before abandoning open access to the federal courts, we
ought to examine any number of other reforms. One might simply accept that federal courts must handle the caseload because
the nation's business has grown so dramatically.2 8 That is, one
ought to question conservative critics who portray the federal
courts as aggrandizing their position by intruding into the province of the other co-equal branches of government. 22 9 I have not
noticed a diminished role for the executive or Congress. Quite
the contrary, the judiciary must expand if it is to function as a
check on co-equal branches of government which have grown
dramatically over the past fifty years.
If a circuit cannot accommodate more than, say, fifteen
judges, more circuits might be preferable to Posner's alternative
of removing cases from the federal to the state system.2 30 More
circuits may result in less uniformity than within the current
federal system, but more uniformity, expertise, and sympathy
towards federal rights than within the fifty state court systems.
Although a super court of appeals may be imperfect, such a
court may allow for more circuits because the super court might
effectively review inconsistent decisions from the various circuit
courts of appeals. 3 1 Thus, more circuit courts of judges need not
yield more uncertain and conflicting case law.
I do not dismiss all attempts to reshape federal court jurisdiction in order to address the caseload problem. A close examination of cases now within the federal system might reveal that
some kinds of cases do not require the special protection associ32
ated with Article III courts. Perhaps, as urged by Judge Rubin
218

See, e.g., Howard, supra note 9, at 368 ("In the 1970's alone, there were seven

").
new federal agencies created, such as EPA and OSHA ....
229 See, e.g., Grazer, Toward an Imperial Judiciary, 41 PUB. INT. 104 (1975); Uddo,
A Wink from the Bench: The Federal Courts and Abortion, 53 TUL. L. REv. 398 (1979).
Justice Rehnquist has implied the same criticism. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 604-06 (1980)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
230 See, e.g., Fiss, The Bureaucratizationof the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 146364 (1983)(increasing number of judges preserves individual judge's responsibility for decision making).
23 Posner rejects proposals for a national court of appeals. R. POSNER, supra note
15, at 162-66. For one such proposal, see Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures:Recommendations for Change, 67
F.R.D. 195, 208-47 (1975).
23M Rubin, supra note 5, at 657.
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and Professor Wright,' 3 diversity jurisdiction ought to be eliminated or altered. Furthermore, a liberal writer might suggest
"procedural" reforms different from those urged by Judge Posner. Judges in the Eleventh Circuit, for example, would realize
significant diminution of their caseload if states within that circuit were to outlaw the death penalty. 3 4 However, no one would
be fooled that such a suggestion was motivated primarily by
concern about overworked federal judges.
Reform may come, but I doubt that it will be radical. Like
promises to reform the tax code, 35 efforts to reshape federal jurisdiction in Congress would be met by heavy pressure from
powerful interest groups."' Those with the least political power
may be excluded from federal court while they may be the litigants most in need of access to federal court. Thus, significant
changes in the caseload are improbable, and many proposed reforms, as discussed above, are unwise.
IV.

THE LAWYER'S ROLE

In the previous sections, I have argued that efforts to curtail
federal court jurisdiction may raise constitutional concerns2
" C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 127-37. Note that Congress recently responded to
such proposals and increased the minimum amount in controversy for federal diversity
jurisdiction to $50,000. However, it could be seriously questioned whether the last such
increase (to $10,000) had any real effect on the case load or if plaintiff's attorneys merely
responded by adjusting the damages clause.
3 By some estimates, as much as 30 percent of the work of the Eleventh Circuit is
devoted to death penalty cases. "Lawyers for Death Row," The Washington Post, January 11, 988, Sec. A, p. 10 (Judges on the Eleventh Circuit complain that "more than 30
percent of its docket is tied up with death penalty cases.").
131 See Bittker, Tax Reform Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 44 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 11, 13 (1987)(describing political compromise leading to 1986 Tax Reform Act);
Yorio, Equity, Efficiency and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395, 395
n.2 (1987)(describing history of passage of the act).
"" See C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 137 ("It is unfortunate that the future of diversity jurisdiction is not likely to be resolved by objective consideration of the arguments
for and against this head of jurisdiction. Any proposal to modify diversity meets immediate organized opposition from those who believe that they have a vested interest in preserving, for their own advantage, the widest possible choice of forum."); Sheran & Isaacman, State Cases Belong in State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 52 (1978)(diversity is
still strongly supported by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America and corporate
lawyers).
' See supra notes 57-149.
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and that proposals for reform of federal court jurisdiction are
often motivated by ideology, not by concern about the pace of
life in judges' chambers. 3 8 I have also speculated that coherent
reform in Congress is improbable. 2s9 An examination of the recent past demonstrates that calls for reform have not produced
significant results. Congress has tinkered with the system, for
example, by dividing the old Fifth Circuit into the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits ' 0 and by creating a limited number of new
judgeships. "" In addition, courts themselves have instituted reforms that have helped move cases more expeditiously without
additional resources. For example, the Fifth Circuit has relied
"2
increasingly on its summary docket to avoid oral argument
and on the power to render decisions without published
opinions.2"
Recent reforms demonstrate what is likely to be the course
of the future: many of the changes will make more efficient use
of limited judicial resources. In this section, I examine the role
of the lawyer in the appellate process. While curtailing federal
jurisdiction radically is undesirable and politically unlikely,
properly educated appellate lawyers can make the system work
more expeditiously and thus diminish part of the caseload
problem.
Former Chief Justice Burger has been a frequent critic of
legal education and lawyer competence.4 6 In a 1973 speech, the

"8
's'
240

See supra notes 155-231.
See supra notes 232-36.
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41, 44,

48 (West Supp. 1988). See Reavley, The Split of the Fifth Circuit: Update and Finnis,
12 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1 (1981); Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 Loy. L. REv. 787
(1980).
.41See C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 12.
242 See RUBIN, supra note 5, at 650.
24 See Proceedings,supra note 8, at 549 (remarks of Judge Rubin).
244 In preparing this paper, I located a report less than ten years old which concluded after deliberation that word processing would speed up distribution of draft opinions. It was more cautious in its assessment of electronic mail. See J. GREENWOOD & L.
FARMER, THE IMPACT OF WORD PROCESSING

AND ELECTRONIC MAIL ON UNITED STATES

COURTS OF APPEALS (1979). New technologies will inevitably help the judicial process. For
example, computers which can transform the spoken word to type-written form will
bring obvious time savings in preparation of trial transcript, draft opinions and
correspondence.
24' See, e.g., Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
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Chief Justice observed that "many judges in general jurisdiction
trial courts have stated. . . that fewer than 25 percent of the
lawyers appearing before them are genuinely qualified; other
judges go as high as 75 percent."2 4 He cited one former colleague who put at two percent the number of genuinely qualified
lawyers.2 47
Inadequate appellate counsel impairs the process in two important ways. The first is that counsel may file frivolous appeals
that should not be appealed at all.248 For example, an appeal
may raise a challenge to findings of fact beyond the reach of an
appeals court or a claim which has been waived because of a
procedural default. Most of the attention on frivolous litigation
has focused on this kind of inadequacy.2 9 The stereotypical
overly litigious appellants are attorneys who represent criminal
defendants, especially death row inmates, 250 and prisoners who
become persistent writ writers in post-conviction and civil rights
cases.

25 '

Less visible is the time lost as a result of a second form of
incompetence: poor briefs and inept appellate argument. Judges'
criticism of the poor quality of briefs is often sharp. 252 They contend that many briefs are useless to the court. Inadequate briefs
waste valuable judicial resources. The late Judge Tate's criticism
underscores that the judge is compelled to perform the attor-

Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227
(1973).
246 Id. at 234.
...Id. at n.14 (citing Tamm, Advocacy Can be Taught - The N.I.T.A. Way, 58
A.B.A. J. 625 (1973).
," A great deal of attention has been given frivolous appellate litigation. See
Cochran, Trouble on the Horizon: The Caseload Problem with the "Frivolous Appeal,"

2 FIFTH

CIRCUIT REP.

249, 251 nn.27-28 (1985).

See Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Responses, 1984
L.J. 845, 848 (focus on "use of sanctions to penalize appellants and their attorneys

49
DUKE

'50 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,895 (1983)(discussing successive
habeas corpus petitions); Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d 338, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1987)(Clark,
J. concurring)(emphasizing need to impose sanctions for delay in death penalty cases).
25, See Cochran, supra note 248, at 251. See also Gabel v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 124
(5th Cir. 1988).
25,
See, e.g., Burger, supra note 245, at 231 n.8; Tate, Federal Appellate Advocacy
in the 1980's 5 AM. J. TRiL ADVOC. 63 (1981), reprinted in R. MARTINEAU, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 55-56 (1987).
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ney's work when the appellate brief is inadequate:
If the brief is turgid, if it is long-winded in making its
points, if the issues it raises are unnecessarily numerous (and
from experience an appellate judge senses many arguments of
error indicate a grasping at weak straws in the absence of even
one strong contention), the brief is less likely to direct the
judge's attention to the points the advocate wishes to make.
For the most effective contribution to the judge's decision of an
appeal, it is essential that the appellate advocate make careful
selection of issues, authorities and relevant facts to be cited,
describe them accurately (including their weaknesses) with appropriate citation, and be concise and lucid in presentation of
the argument. Otherwise, the appellate judge may use the brief
only for a cursory check of the result reached by a proposed
opinion, virtually as if counsel had filed no brief at all.2 53
The extent of poor briefing is difficult to estimate, but judges
suggest that it is significant."'
Commentators can identify a number of causes for such
poor advocacy, 5 " and legal educators cannot avoid a substantial
portion of the blame. For example, an ABA report criticized law
schools for their role in producing inadequate appellate attorneys..25 Their failings are several. One is inattention to appellate
skills. 57 Two, despite almost exclusive emphasis on appellate
opinions, law professors ignore appellate courts as institutions,
leaving the lawyer ignorant about "functions of the appellate
court (error correction and law development), the goal of the appellate judge. . ., and the difference in functions between an intermediate appellate court and a supreme court .... ,,218 Stu-

dents graduate ignorant of appellate jurisdiction, appellate rules,
and trial rules (like issue preservation) that affect appellate liti-

"I

Tate, supra note 252, at 67-68.

2I Id.

"5See, e.g., M. FONTHAM. WRrrEN AND ORAL ADVOCACY (1985) at 53-54.
'50Appellate Litigation Skills Training: The Role of the Law Schools, 54 U. CIN. L.
REv. 129, 133 (1985) Report and Recommendation of the Committee on Appellate Skills
Training, Appellate Judges' Conference, Judicial Administration Division of the American Bar Association.
"I Id. at 131.

...Id. at 137.
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gation.159 These gaps in a litigator's knowledge add inappropriate appeals to the caseload because attorneys file suits properly
dismissed on procedural grounds apart from the merits.
The ABA recognized that the vast majority of law schools
teach advocacy courses. Those courses are singled out for special
criticism:
First and foremost, these programs treat appellate litigation as involving only two aspects - writing a brief and making an oral argument. They ignore all of the other important
ingredients of appellate litigation . . . Second, . . . because
they lack a realistic appeal record they do not aid in the development of the skill that is unique to appellate litigation: building a case out of a record. Third, as a result of the first two
defects, the issues argued in these programs are usually abstract legal questions without factual content upon which most
appeals are decided. 60
The report's conclusion is poignant: as taught in most schools,
moot court programs "do not and cannot be thought of as con'2 6
tributing to appellate skills training." '
Law schools must respond to the report. We can do a better
job training advocates. However, any such reforms in the law
school curriculum will improve only the skills of future lawyers
and thus will not significantly affect the nature of appellate
practice for many years. If the ABA report is correct, most of
the appellate lawyers currently practicing in the federal courts
were inadequately trained in law school and continue to ply
their trade inadequately. Therefore, beyond reforms in legal education, steps must be taken to address the deficiencies of current litigators.
In that regard, it is noteworthy that courts and legislators
nationwide have increased interest in sanctions as a way to dam
the flood of litigation.2 6 2 Many courts and legislators believe that
"frivolous suits have diverted away scarce judicial resources. '"63
59 Id. at 138.
Id. at 142. See also M. FONTHAM, supra note 255, at 54.

ZO0

201

Id.

"'
See generally Cochran, supra note 248; Martineau,
13 Fleming Sales

supra note 249.
Co. v. Bailey, 1 Fed. Rules Serv. 3d 1501, 1508 (N.D. Ill. 1985).

1988]

APPELLATE LAWYER'S ROLE

That is, many believe that imposing sanctions will deter a significant number of lawsuits: ". .there is a now-identifiable trend
to put in place what some believe to be sufficient deterrence factors in the form of assessments of monetary sanctions against
unsuccessful litigants and their attorneys for [filing frivolous appeals]. This, its proponents believe, will in turn reduce the num2 4
ber of future appeals." "
Despite concerns that "the standard for imposing sanctions
is not so liberalized as to chill the vigorous litigation of legitimate claims and defenses, 2 11 some courts have begun to employ
sanctions in questionable cases. For example, Professor Cochran
has argued that in Hagerty v. Succession of Clement,2 6 the
Fifth Circuit used "improper criteria for the imposition of sanctions." 7' The court has also imposed sanctions on pro se state
prisoners. In Gabel v. Lynaugh,2 " the court taxed costs of $10
against prisoners who failed to present the issue appealed upon
to the lower court. Gabel does not make clear whether the panel
was motivated by a desire to deter frivolous litigation or by a
need to express its pique.
Concern has been voiced that sanctions will be used to impair open access to courts. To be sure, such access is a positive
value in our system.2 9 Thus, using sanctions as a device to shift

Cochran, supra note 248, at 251.
266 Id. at 257.
2749 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1984).
267 Cochran, supra note 248, at 260 (court's analysis ignores notice requirement
264

before imposition of sanctions; court failed to impose requirement of attorney's knowledge of frivolous nature of appeal before sanctions can be imposed under 28 U.S.C. §
1927).
'" 835 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1988). The court found the appeal frivolous because "we
are a court of errors and appeals; and the trial court cannot have erred as to matters
which were not presented to it." Id. at 125. There are exceptions to that rule, of course.
See Rojas v. Richardon, 703 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1983)(setting criteria for plain fundamental error). The court in Gabel also failed to acknowledge that frivolous appeals can often
be screened without significant investment of judges' time. See Cochran, supra note 248,
at 261.
269 F. COFFIN, supra note 25, at 16-17. In cases involving indigents, the Supreme
Court has frequently emphasized the importance of access to the court system. See, e.g.,
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)(state may not deny access to court for indigents who seek dissolution of marriage); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)(where
prisoners not allowed to assist others in preparation of writ there is denial of access to
court for illiterates); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)(denial of counsel to indi-
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attorneys' costs, for example, to the losing party is a strong sanction that could quite likely over-deter plaintiffs from asserting
legitimate rights. Even in the current climate of caseload crisis,
we should remember that positive law reform has been possible
because litigants have been willing to press novel theories.2 70
Thus, the challenge for courts is how to use sanctions to improve the efficient operation of the court system without deterring litigants from pursuing law reform. In Thomas v. Capital
Security Services, Inc.,271 the Fifth Circuit en banc interpreted
amended Rule 11, requiring the district court to impose sanctions in certain instances. The court emphasized that drafts of
the amendment to Rule 11 "expressly disclaim[ed] any intent to
chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual
272
or legal theories.
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that district courts must
avoid a "natural tendency. . . to gravitate toward imposing" attorneys' fees and costs as sanctions for violations of Rule 11.27
Instead, "[s]anctions should be educational and rehabilitative in
character and, as such, tailored to the particular wrong. 2 74 Balancing open access to the courts and the need to deter frivolous
litigation, the Fifth Circuit "specifically adopt[ed] the principle
that the sanction imposed should be the least severe sanction
adequate to the purpose of Rule 11. ' ' 275 To be sure, the district
court's broad discretion includes a wide array of appropriate
sanctions. For example, "[w]hat is 'appropriate, may be a warm
friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in
open court, compulsory legal education, monetary sanction, or
' ' 27 I urge a
other
to the litigation
circumstances.
similarmeasures
approach appropriate
to handle frivolous
or poor 6briefing
in

gent on appeal violates fourteenth amendment).
270

See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.

1985)("Vital changes have been wrought by those members of the bar who have dared to
challenge the received wisdom, and a rule that penalized such innovation and industry
would run counter to our notions of the common law itself.").
271 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988)(en banc).
272
273
274

276
276

Id. at 877.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 878.
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the appellate court. "7
I want to particularly emphasize that judges spend a great
deal of unnecessary time on items other than frivolous appeals.
Commentators have been quick to link wasted judicial time to
meritless appeals.2 8 That may be true, although in many instances staff counsel identifies such cases, avoiding waste of judicial time. 7 However, poor briefs in non-frivolous cases may
waste far more judicial time. A poor brief means that a judge
''may use the brief only for a cursory check of the result reached
by a proposed opinion, virtually as if counsel had filed no brief
at all. '28 1 Such briefs are quite common in certain classes of
cases, 2 8 notably inpost-conviction litigation and in section 1983
litigation. In such cases, the state often submits a "thin" brief
with knowledge that the appellate court will do its work. Those
two categories of cases comprise a significant portion of the
Fifth Circuit's caseload.2 2
I propose that the court rebel against attorneys who waste
the court's time. Judges with whom I have spoken informally
confirm that state and government attorneys are frequent offenders and that, because the state or United States eventually
prevails, the offense goes unnoticed.28 Courts have available
draconian sanctions, for example, dismissal or monetary sanctions.2 8 " Those ought to be last resorts, but a court would dis2" Appellate courts have similar discretion available. See Martineau, supra note
249, at 857-64 (discussing various sources of authority to impose sanctions); id. at 869-70
(discussing non-monetary sanctions).
278 See, e.g., id. See also discussion supra at notes 262-68.
...See Cochran, supra note 248, at 261 (suggesting that frivolous appeals lend
themselves to dismissal without significant investment of time); Rubin & Ganucheau,
Appellate Delay and Cost - An Ancient and Common Disease: Is it Intractable?, 42
MD. L. REV. 752 (1983) (describing procedures within Fifth Circuit).
280 Tate, supra note 252, at 68.
281 This observation is based on discussions both with a number of attorneys and
with judges.
282 For example, prisoner cases and direct criminal appeals represented almost 42%
of the Fifth Circuit's caseload in 1986-87. Clerk's Annual Report supra note 36, at 13.
See also, id. at 2 (prisoner appeals cases increased by 353% between 1986 and 1987).
28 Undoubtedly, the public interest requires that the court not release a prisoner as
a sanction for ineffective representation by counsel for the state or government. And yet
the fact that courts perform much of the work for the attorney encourages bad work
habits. The attorney falsely assumes that winning the appeal was a result of his efforts.
"' Most of the law on sanctions at the appellate level is aimed at appellants' con-
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cover dramatic improvement in the quality of appellate briefs
with eventual concomitant time savings if it refused to accept
poor briefing by counsel. Following the suggestions in Thomas, a
court could inform counsel of the inadequacies of his brief, in
private, in open court, or in its written opinion."' It might refuse to accept careless, indifferent briefs and compel resubmission of the brief. It might also compel the attorney to attend a
continuing legal education seminar. If the latter sanction were
imposed, some aspiring law school or professional association
would undoubtedly quickly put in place a meaningful CLE program, perhaps modeled on the highly successful N.I.T.A. trial
advocacy program. 8 6
The Fifth Circuit already recognizes its obligation to help
educate members of the practicing bar. Members of the Fifth
Circuit have participated in various educational programs.27
They offer a unique perspective. 8 8 When they speak candidly
about their approach to attorneys' work product, the bar listens.
duct. See Martineau, supra note 249 at 864-70 (reviewing bases for sanctions). But the
court's power to impose sanctions on an appellee might be found in the inherent authority of the court, Roadway Express, Inc., v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980), or in the
federal rules of appellate procedure. FED. R. App. P. 47 (authorizing each circuit to adopt
rules not inconsistent with the appellate rules).
' Courts have used similar sanctions to reprimand appellants' attorneys. See, e.g.,
United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d 491, 495 (2d Cir.)(criticizing attorney
for undue delay and vexatious multiplication of proceedings), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1144
(1983); Shuffman v. Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 1981)(observing
that attorney unreasonably prolonged litigation), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982).
2U See Tamm, supra note 247 (describing N.I.T.A. trial advocacy program).
287 See example, Fifth Circuit judges participate frequently in the Appellate Advocacy Seminar sponsored by the Bar Association of the Fifth Federal Circuit. Judges'
remarks are frequently reprinted in the Fifth Circuit Reporter. See, e.g., Talk by Judge
Sam D. Johnson, 2 Fifth Circuit Rep. 345 (1985); Talks by Judges Rubin and Higginbotham, 2 Fifth Circuit Rep. 143 (1985).
'" The following excerpts from Judge Reavley's remarks at the 1986 seminar
demonstrate the kind of candid and helpful insights offered by the judges:
III. The judge of your case probably will prefer to affirm the trial court and
may be weary of the extreme adversarial posture. The judge loveth an honest
advocate.
IV. When the judge of your case reads your brief, she will probably not be
savoring it with a cool drink on the beach. Nor will she have high anticipation
or great curiosity about your cases. She will hope to spend a minimum amount
of time to get in mind, promptly and accurately, the relevant facts and the
issues which she must decide in order to get your case off her docket.
Fifth Circuit Appellate Practice and Advocacy Seminar, Oct. 23-24, 1986, G-2.
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Thus, in addition to sanctions, the Court might consider mandating participation in such programs as a condition of membership in the appellate bar.
The current literature on the appellate process contains
many more suggestions on how the appellate courts can deal
with caseload pressure. For example, Professor Martineau has
advocated a more informal dialogue between judges and attorneys than the all too short formal oral argument.289 Such discussions might be by conference calls, saving travel time for judge
and litigants. Follow up discussions might save the courts' time
because attorneys could research areas of the law which under
our current approach must be researched by judges and their
clerks if those issues are inadequately addressed in the appellate
briefs.
Even if we retain formal oral argument, courts might save
judicial time by requiring attorneys to submit additional briefs
on matters which are inadequately briefed, but which trouble
the judges. Unlike my earlier discussion of poor briefing, even
counsel who has effectively argued an issue may not have anticipated all of the court's concerns. In both instances, though, I
propose that courts save their resources by compelling attorneys
to do their own work. Many attorneys would welcome the chance
to address the court's specific concerns. No doubt, losing attorneys are greatly frustrated if an opinion is based on analysis not
presented in the prevailing party's brief.
This discussion is not exhaustive of possible reforms. Instead I want to generate interest in reforming the appellate process by better management of resources rather than by closing
the door to federal right holders. The caseload crisis should remind federal courts that litigants hold them in high regard.
V.

CONCLUSION

When Judge Jolly invited me and fellow panelists to speak
at the 1988 Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, he asked us to
consider appeals in the twenty-first century. Appellate practice
'"" See Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the
Conventional Wisdom, 72 IowA L. REv. 1, 30-31 (1986).
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will change in subtle ways which most of us cannot anticipate.
However, while appeals will change, I doubt that the changes
will be drastic.
As a response to the increased caseload, some people have
urged curtailing the appeal of right. That position is premised
on the assumption that Congress may eliminate the courts of appeals entirely or shape its jurisdiction however it desires. While
not free from uncertainty, such proposals may be unconstitutional.2 9 For example, the Supreme Court's legislative courts decisions allow a trade off, permitting Congress to place considerable responsibility for Article III cases in non-Article III bodies.
However, essential to such schemes is availability of review by
an Article III court. Hence, in many cases, appellate review has
become constitutionalized 2 91 More importantly, appeals courts
now serve the review function originally served by the Supreme
Court.2 92
Efforts to reshape federal court jurisdiction are frequently
politically motivated. Heavy weight interest groups will effectively scuttle major restructuring of federal court jurisdiction.
Non-political proposals may succeed in Congress, but will only
involve tinkering with the system and will not change the appellate process in dramatic ways. 9 3
Instead, the appellate courts will do what they have done
traditionally. They will rely on new technology to improve the
process and they will make better use of existing resources.2 9' In
this article, I have paid particular attention to the role of the
lawyer in the appellate process. I concur in observations that
lawyers often perform inadequately. Inadequate briefing results
in significant loss of judicial time. In many cases, especially
those involving post-conviction relief and prisoners' rights,
courts do the work for the state. Sensitive use of non-monetary
sanctions in such cases could shift responsibility back to attorneys to do their own work, with measurable savings to the appellate courts.
290
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292
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See
See

supra notes 59-149 and accompanying text.
supra notes 70-149 and accompanying text.
supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
supra notes 154-236 and accompanying text.
Estreicher, supra note 170, at 570-77.

